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INTRODUCTION
Mail fraud has been referred to as the "Colt .45" of the federal
prosecutor.1 Together, mail and wire fraud are among the most fre-
t B.S., Case Western Reserve University, 2001; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law
School, 2004. The author thanks Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his thoughtful sugges-
tions and generous assistance.
I Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980)
(noting that the federal mail fraud statute is cherished by prosecutors because of its "sim-
plicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity").
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quently charged federal crimes, and each qualifies as a predicate of-
fense for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) .2 When combined with RICO, mail and wire fraud can serve
as the jurisdictional link that allows federal prosecutors to charge
traditional state-law crimes, enabling them to strike at the heart of
criminal enterprises. 3 The scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes,
therefore, plays a critical role in determining how aggressive the fed-
eral government can be when investigating and bringing charges
against complex criminal operations.
Recently, questions have arisen concerning the scope of these
statutes and their applicability to international smuggling operations.
Specifically, three circuit courts have considered whether the federal
mail and wire fraud statutes can be invoked against persons smuggling
goods into a foreign country in an effort to avoid import duties and to
defraud that country's government of the revenues to which it is enti-
ded under its own laws. 4 At the center of the issue lies the common
law "revenue rule," which generally precludes courts from enforcing
foreign revenue laws.5 The First Circuit relied on this doctrine when
it refused to extend the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes to
international smuggling activities and concluded that such criminal
prosecutions would be akin to enforcing foreign import duty laws. 6
Resolution of this issue will have a profound effect on the federal
government's ability to fight organized crime in the United States.
For example, according to the United States Customs Service, ciga-
rette smuggling operations have "generate[d] billions of dollars of
2 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2000) (listing both mail fraud and wire fraud under the
definition of "racketeering activity"). If mail fraud is the federal prosecutor's Colt .45, then
RICO is her M-16. In addition to its well-documented venue, joinder and evidentiary ad-
vantages, RICO offers several additional advantages, notably its civil forfeiture provision
and increased sentencing exposure. See, e.g.,JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR
CRiME 601-02 (2001). Similarly, both mail and wire fraud qualify as underlying offenses
for the federal money laundering statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7) (A).
4 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 602.
4 See United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) [here-
States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587-88 (1st Cir. 1996).
5 See, e.g., I DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 97-100, 101-03 (Lawrence
Collins et al. eds., 12th ed. 1993); F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 495-96
(1973). The Fourth Circuit recently debated whether the revenue rule applies only to the
enforcement of foreign tax judgments, see Pasquantino I, 336 F.3d at 326-28, or more broadly
to the mere recognition of foreign tax laws, see id. at 338 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Although
a majority of the court, sitting en banc, ultimately accepted the narrow formulation, see id.
at 329 ("[A]ll persuasive authority supports the position that .... [the revenue rule] per-
tains to the nonenforcement of foreign taxjudgments as opposed to the nonrecognition of
foreign revenue laws."), the Fourth Circuit's conclusion is far from unassailable, see infra
notes 100-03, 109 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part II.A (discussing Boots, 80 F.3d 580).
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profit for criminal organizations around the world."'7 Much like their
legitimate counterparts, criminal organizations require substantial
funding to conduct their illicit activities.8 Therefore, permitting the
application of the mail and wire fraud statutes to cases of interna-
tional smuggling would provide the federal government with a power-
ful weapon against transnational organized criminal entities operating
in the United States.
While the roots of the common law "revenue rule" run relatively
deep,9 the question whether it precludes federal mail and wire fraud
liability where the scheme alleged involves defrauding a foreign gov-
ernment of tax revenues or import duties has only recently received
attention. Of the trio of circuit courts to consider this issue, only one
held that the revenue rule does indeed prevent the government from
charging mail or wire fraud in these circumstances.1 0 The Second
and Fourth Circuits, however, have concluded that the revenue rule is
"inapplicable" and therefore wire fraud may be charged where the
object of a scheme is to defraud a foreign government of its tax
revenues. 11
7 U.S. Customs Service, Tobacco Smuggling, at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/enforce
ment/ice/investigations/tobaccosmuggling.xml (last visited Aug. 24, 2003); see also Attor-
ney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 129 n.35 (2d Cir.
2001) ("At the time of RICO's passage, it was well known that organized crime organiza-
tions engaged in tax evasion and smuggling."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002).
8 Congress has recognized this connection in the context of international terrorist
organizations. The Patriot Act, enacted in response to the tragic events of September 11,
2001, contains numerous provisions targeted at undermining the ability of these organiza-
tions to fund their operations. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(b)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 297 (2001) (indicating that a cen-
tral objective of the Patriot Act is to "increase the strength of ... measures to prevent,
detect, and prosecute ... the financing of terrorism").
9 The origin of the revenue rule is traced to the eighteenth century English case of
Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775), which states in dicta that "no
country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another." For an extended discussion of
the facts and legal issues in that case, see Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 328. See also William J.
Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the Revenue
Rule, 22 Hous. J. IT'L L. 265, 272-73 (2000) (discussing Holman).
10 See Boots, 80 F.3d at 587-88; cf R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 106 (holding that the
revenue rule precluded Canada from bringing a civil RICO suit alleging mail and wire
fraud in furtherance of smuggling operations); Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos.,
188 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (precluding Ecuador from bringing a civil
RICO suit under circumstances similar to those found in R.J. Reynolds). A panel of the
Fourth Circuit subsequently agreed with the Boots court, see United States v. Pasquantino,
305 F.3d 291, 296-97 (4th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Pasquantino 1], but that decision was
vacated, see United States v. Pasquantino, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 585 (2003), and the de-
fendants' convictions were reinstated following an en banc rehearing, Pasquantino II, 336
F.3d 321.
11 Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 331; United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 551-52 (2d
Cir. 1997). The indictment in Trapilo, which was reinstated by the Second Circuit, charged
money laundering conspiracy, naming wire fraud as the specified unlawful activity. 130
F.3d at 549; see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)-(2), (h) (2000).
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This Note will argue that any decision to bar application of the
mail and wire statutes to schemes of this type is based on a misunder-
standing of the reasons behind the revenue rule, and thereby operates
as an improper restriction on the federal government's ability to
counteract the proliferation of international organized criminal enti-
ties operating in the United States. 12 Quite simply, none of the policy
concerns justifying the creation of the revenue rule-respect for na-
tional sovereignty,13 proper separation of powers among the branches
of government,1 4 or questions of judicial competency in dealing with
foreign law 5-are triggered when the United States seeks to protect
its own national interests by prosecuting these operations pursuant to
criminal laws enacted by Congress. 16 Accordingly, this aspect of the
common law "plainly ha[s] no place in the federal fraud statutes,' 17
and the judiciary has no authority to restrict the scope of the mail and
wire fraud provisions by engrafting onto them the limitation imposed
by the revenue rule.
Part I will lay the foundation for considering the question ad-
dressed by discussing the elements of the mail and wire fraud statutes
and by briefly describing the origins of the revenue rule and its subse-
quent incorporation into American jurisprudence. To complete this
foundation, the Note will then identify and discuss the three prevail-
ing modern justifications for the revenue rule, and provide a brief
summary of existing arguments concerning the validity of these justifi-
cations in the present context. In Part II, this Note will present the
three circuit court cases that have directly considered the issue at
hand, summarizing the essential facts and highlighting the critical as-
pects of the courts' reasoning.
12 Of course, the federal government has a legitimate interest in prosecuting schemes
of this type that are not connected to organized crime: preventing the use of the United
States' communication systems to serve criminal agendas. See infra notes 123-29 and ac-
companying text.
13 See infra Part I.B.1.
14 See infra Part I.B.2.
15 See infra Part I.B.3.
16 See infra Part III.
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. i, 25 (1999). in Neder, the Supreme Court
concluded that the federal fraud statutes were presumed to incorporate the common law
understanding of fraud. See id. at 21-23 ("[W]e must presume that Congress intended to
incorporate materiality 'unless the statute otherwise dictates.'" (quoting Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted))). No
such presumption should apply in the present context, however, since it is not at all clear
that the revenue rule was incorporated into the common-law understanding of fraud. Cf
id. at 23. Further, the proper inquiry is not whether Congress expressly rejected inclusion
of the revenue rule into the mail and wire fraud statutes, but rather whether applying the
revenue rule to mail and wire fraud prosecutions makes sense in the first place. Cf id. at
25 (noting that certain elements of common law fraud are not implicit in federal fraud
statutes because these elements would be incompatible with the statutes Congress
enacted).
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Finally, Part III will analyze the merits of the question presented.
Adopting the approach followed by Judge Calabresi in a related con-
text, 18 this Note will consider each of the traditional justifications for
applying the revenue rule in light of the present controversy. Al-
though ample consideration will be given to the arguments previously
advanced by various courts of appeals, a substantial component of the
analysis will focus on novel approaches to the issues presented. Ulti-
mately, this Note will conclude that none of the traditional justifica-
tions for the revenue rule validate its application as a limitation upon
the scope of the federal fraud provisions. Therefore, the mail and
wire fraud statutes should not be constrained in this manner, and the
United States should be free to prosecute schemes to defraud foreign
governments of import tax revenues under the U.S. fraud statutes.
I
SETrING THE TABLE: STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK
A. Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes
For the purposes of this Note, and in fact for most issues of statu-
tory interpretation in this area, the federal mail fraud 19 and wire fraud
statutes20 are interchangeable.21 Both statutes are triggered when a
particular type of communication is made "for the purpose of execut-
ing [a] scheme or artifice [to defraud]."22 Critically, neither statute
requires that the fraud actually be successful. 23 The government need
only prove that "some actual harm or injury was contemplated by the
schemer."2 4 However, no liability can attach if the scheme contem-
plated is not in fact a crime. 25
18 See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
19 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
20 Id. § 1343.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1088 (2d Cir. 1996); cf McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 374 (1987) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1341; id. § 1343. Section 1341 is chargeable when the mails are used to
execute the fraud, id. §1341, and § 1343 is chargeable when any "wire, radio, or television
communication" is used to execute the fraud, id. § 1343.
23 See id. §§ 1341, 1343.
24 United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir. 1970); see
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (applying to anyone who, "having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud," uses the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme); 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (applying to anyone who, "having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud," uses "wire, radio, or television communication" in furtherance of
the fraudulent scheme); see also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896) ("It is
enough if, having devised a scheme to defraud, the defendant with a view of executing it[,]
deposits [the communication into the mails].").
25 See United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000). In United States v.
Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit appeared to adopt the contrary
position, indicating that legal impossibility was not a defense to wire fraud. See id. at 552
("[WI hat is proscribed [by § 1343] is use of the telecommunication systems of the United
States in furtherance of a scheme whereby one intends to defraud another of property.
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Assuming for the moment that the revenue rule does not apply in
this context, an operation to smuggle goods out of the United States
to avoid a foreign country's import duties clearly constitutes a scheme
to defraud. After all, such an operation, if successful, would deprive
the foreign government of tax revenues to which it was entitled.26
Even if the scheme was thwarted prior to completion, the perpetrators
would nevertheless be liable, since the statutes criminalize the mere
formation of the plan to defraud. 27 Of course, defrauding a foreign
government of its own tax revenues does not become a crime in the
United States until the perpetrator utilizes a mailing or wiring as part
of her scheme. 28 As a practical matter, however, this second element
is easily satisfied. 29 In this context, for example, wire fraud liability
would be perfected if the government could prove that the defend-
Nothing more is required."). However, the Pierce court clarified this aspect of Trapilo, af-
firmatively concluding that legal impossibility may be a valid defense to wire fraud where
the scheme involved smuggling liquor into Canada:
If no Canadian duty or tax actually existed, the [defendants] were no more
guilty of wire fraud than they would have been had they used the wires in
furtherance of a scheme to [surreptitiously] transport liquor down the
Hudson River from Yonkers into New York City, by flat-bottomed boat in
the dead of night, in the sincere but mistaken belief that New York City
imposes a duty on such cross-border shipments.
Pierce, 224 F.3d at 166.
26' Rather than defrauding the target of its property, which might be described as the
paradigmatic object in mail or wire fraud cases, these smuggling schemes threaten the
foreign government's right to obtain property, arising from that nation's tax laws. See
Pierce, 224 F.3d at 165-66. Indeed, prosecutors consistently use the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes to prosecute schemes designed to deprive a state government of tax reve-
nues. See, e.g., United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Melvin, 544 F.2d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 496 (4th
Cir. 1975). Aside from the possible application of the revenue rule, there is no valid basis
upon which to justify precluding the United States government from criminalizing similar
fraudulent schemes targeted at avoiding the tax revenues of foreign governments.
27 See Pierce, 224 F.3d at 166 ("If ... [the import] duty never became payable because
no liquor ever actually made its way across the border, the scheme itself would nonetheless
be punishable."). Inexplicably, the dissent in Pasquantino II cites Pierce for the opposite
proposition; that no liability could attach until at least one bottle of liquor or carton of
cigarettes crossed the relevant border. See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d 321, 342 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Gregory.J. dissenting) (citing Pierce, 224 F.3d at 165) (arguing that no prosecution would
be possible in these circumstances because "the requisite property would never have come
into existence"). Setting aside Judge Gregory's complete misapprehension of Pierce, his
reasoning remains misguided, since mail and wire fraud are inchoate crimes. See supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
28 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (requiring use of interstate or foreign commerce), with
id. § 1341 (requiring only a mailing). No interstate or foreign commerce is required by
§ 1341 because Congress's power of the post enables it to federalize frauds utilizing only
intrastate mailings. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (Congress has the power "[t]o establish
[plost [o]ffices and post [r]oads.").
29 For an example of the Supreme Court's willingness to stretch the boundaries of the
"for the purpose of executing" language in § 1341, see Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S.
705 (1989).
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ants had placed interstate telephone calls to order cigarettes, which
they later smuggled into Canada. 30
B. The Common Law Revenue Rule and Its Justifications
The common law revenue rule's origin is traced to Lord Mans-
field's statement in Holman v. Johnson" that "no country ever takes
notice of the revenue laws of another. ' 32 Although scholars have
questioned the wisdom of founding a modern common law rule on
two-century-old, isolated dicta,33 American courts have maintained al-
legiance to Lord Mansfield's proclamation. 34 These courts advance a
variety ofjustifications for continuing allegiance to the rule, including
respect for foreign sovereignty, 35 separation of powers concerns, 36
and the inability of American courts to properly interpret foreign tax
codes. 37
1. Respect for National Sovereignty
American courts frequently justify continued adherence to the
revenue rule on the grounds that it precludes foreign nations from
extending their sovereignty into the United States. 38 The foundation
of this reasoning is traced to the statements of Judge Learned Hand,
30 These hypothetical facts are substantially similar to those in Trapilo, 130 F.3d at
549.
31 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (KB. 1775); see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
32 98 Eng. Rep. at 1121 (dicta); see also Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165
(KB. 1779) ("One nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of another." (footnote
omitted)).
33 See, e.g., Kovatch, supra note 9, at 287 (calling the revenue rule "an anachronism in
American law"); Recent Case, Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Hold-
ings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REv. 2333, 2337 (2002) (indicating that
the revenue rule reflects "an outdated, narrow view of the interplay between national sover-
eignty and judicial authority").
34 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 483 (1987). But cf id.
§ 483 reporters' note 2, at 613 ("In an age when... instantaneous transfer of assets can be
easily arranged, the rationale for not recognizing or enforcing tax judgments is largely
obsolete.").
35 See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d
103, 111-13 (2d Cir. 2001) ("In part, the reluctance of courts to delve into [a foreign
sovereign's revenue laws] is based on the 'desire to avoid embarrassing another state by
scrutinizing [those] laws."' (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
437 (1964))), cer. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002).
36 See, e.g., id. at 113-15 ("When a foreign nation appears ... in our courts seeking
enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of
foreign relations that are assigned to .. .the political branches of government.").
37 See, e.g., id. at 137 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
38 See id. at 111 (noting that courts have explained that the revenue rule "help[s]
nations maintain their mutual respect and security"); see also Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 448
(White, J, dissenting) ("[N]o country has an obligation to further the governmental inter-
ests of a foreign sovereign.").
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discussing the now repudiated principle that states ought not enforce
the revenue laws of sister states:
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is,
or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves
the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are
incompetent to deal, and which are [entrusted] to other authori-
ties. It may commit the domestic state to a position which would
seriously embarrass its neighbor. Revenue laws fall within the same
reasoning; they affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its
criminal laws. No court ought to undertake an inquiry which it can-
not prosecute without determining whether those laws are conso-
nant with its own notions of what is proper.3 9
The basic concern behind this particular justification involves the
possibility that an American court would be asked to enforce a foreign
tax law that offended the United States' sense of sound policy.40 Ac-
cording to this argument, if U.S. courts generally enforced foreign
sovereigns' revenue laws, then selective refusal where enforcement of-
fended U.S. policy would embarrass the foreign state in question.4 1
Therefore, in the interest of promoting amicable foreign relations, no
assistance should be given in any case; "[s]afety lies only in universal
rejection. '4 2
Of course, permitting mail or wire fraud prosecutions to go for-
ward when the alleged object of the fraud is a foreign government's
excise tax on imported goods is not the direct enforcement of foreign
tax law; it is instead the enforcement of the criminal law of the United
States.4 3 The relevance of this distinction, however, is disputed.44
39 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J., concurring). Al-
though the Supreme Court later held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states
to enforce tax judgments rendered by courts of other states, see Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935),Judge Hand's concerns remain viable in the present
context, see Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. B.C. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("[T]here is no provision similar to the [Full Faith and Credit Clause] in the
Constitution which would require that the courts of this country extend full faith and
credit to the judgments of a foreign country.").
40 See R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 113 (advancing a hypothetical situation in which a
foreign sovereign requests that an American court assist with the enforcement of an immi-
graLion tax, which is seluv-'--y applaeu to II of da -cligi... thni
groups).
41 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42 Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, [1954] I.R. 89, 107 (Ir. S.C.), quoted in RJ. Reynolds,
268 F.3d at 112.
43 See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d 321, 330-31 (4th Cir. 2003); Elizabeth J. Farnam, Racke-
teering, RICO and the Revenue Rule in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds: Civil
RICO Claims for Foreign Tax Law Violations, 77 WASH. L. REv. 843, 870-72 (2002).
44 Compare 1 DicEy & MoRRs, supra note 5, at 103 (contending that "where no ques-
tion of enforcement arises, foreign revenue laws are applied by the courts if they are rele-
vant to an issue"), and RJ. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi,J., dissenting) ("[C]oncern
for extra-territoriality ... has no meaning whatever when what is enforced by imposing
damages or penalties is, in fact, a domestic law .... ."), with United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d
[Vol. 89:231
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Those contending that this distinction is of import contend that Con-
gress, in passing the mail and wire fraud statutes, implicitly deter-
mined that prosecution for the prohibited behavior "advances our own
[American] interests, and any collateral effect furthering the govern-
mental interests of a foreign sovereign is, therefore, necessarily
incidental. '45
2. Separation of Powers
Another justification for modem application of the revenue rule
flows from the perceived impropriety of courts addressing issues of
foreign relations. 46 In particular, courts have reasoned that questions
surrounding "domestic collection of foreign taxes and the enforce-
ment of United States taxes abroad" are reserved for the executive
and legislative branches. 4 7 For example, the Second Circuit has rea-
soned that,
[a]bsent an explicit indication to the contrary, there should not be
attributed to Congress an intent to give the courts of this nation, in
this highly sensitive area of intergovernmental relations, the power
to affect rights to property wherever located in the world. The ap-
parent necessity of tax treaties underscores the conclusion that Con-
gress has seen fit to handle this problem in another manner.48
This justification has not escaped criticism either. A cogent ex-
ample of such criticism can be found in Judge Calabresi's dissent in
Attorney General of Canada v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.4 9 After
noting that the mail and wire fraud statutes were enacted through the
typical legislative process, Calabresi argued that the political branches
intentionally "created the cause of action" in question.5 0 Therefore,
he concluded, courts permitting prosecutions under these statutes,
rather than impermissibly creating policy, are simply giving effect to
580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[U]pholding defendants' [wire fraud] conviction would amount
functionally to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws."). Similarly dis-
puted, yet beyond the scope of this Note, is whether a distinction should be made between
cases where a foreign government seeks a civil remedy under United States law and cases
where the United States government itself chooses to prosecute a criminal action. Compare
R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103 (holding that the revenue rule barred the Canadian govern-
ment's civil RICO suit arising out of alleged smuggling operations), with United States v.
Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997) (permitting a federal prosecution based on allega-
tions of wire fraud in connection with avoidance of Canadian import duties).
45 R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 136 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
46 See, e.g., Boots, 80 F.3d at 587 ("[F]or our courts effectively to pass on [revenue] laws
raises issues of foreign relations which are assigned to and better handled by the legislative
and executive branches of government.").
47 R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 115.
48 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 379 U.S. 378 (1965), quoted in R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 115.
49 268 F.3d at 136-37 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
50 See id. at 137 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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the foreign policy appropriately promulgated by the executive and
legislative branches..5 '
3. Competency of American Courts to Interpret Foreign Law
The final prevailing justification for the revenue rule rests on
concerns regarding judicial capability, and posits that American
courts, naive as to the laws of other nations, should "avoid interpret-
ing and applying foreign tax laws."'52 Proponents of this view assert
that courts determining whether a fraud prosecution successfully
demonstrated criminal intent to defraud a foreign government of im-
port duties would be required to rule on challenges involving the un-
derlying foreign statutes. 53 If a defendant claimed legal impossibility,
for example, an American court would have to ascertain whether the
alleged scheme-what the defendant intended to do-was in fact a
violation of foreign law. 54 In addition, in any case involving successful
prosecutions for mail or wire fraud, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines require courts to determine the extent of the loss as a fac-
tor in establishing the sentence imposed. 55
As before, the validity of this justification for the revenue rule is
debatable. Once again, Judge Calabresi joins the band of critics, as-
serting that the argument is "dubious in a global economy, which re-
quires a great amount of interpretation of foreign laws." 56 Calabresi
declined to address this justification in detail, however, believing him-
self to be bound by Second Circuit precedent.57 The Trapilo court's
51 See id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
52 Pasquantino 1, 305 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd en banc, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir.
2003).
53 See id. at 298; United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996).
54 See Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 298.
55 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2001). An exception exists
where the scheme targets the intangible nonproperty right to honest services. In those
instances, § 2C1.7 is used to determine the appropriate sentence. See id. app. A, at 459.
56 R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 137 n.4 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ("'[F] ederal courts have
shown a commendable ability to get their hands around foreign law when fully briefed on
the issues.' ") (quoting Roger 1. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the US. Federal Courts,
43 Am.J. COMP. L. 581, 586 (1995)).
57 Calabresi contended that an earlier Second Circuit case, United States v. Pierce, 224
F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000), resolved the issue. See R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d at 137-39 ("Whatever
the possible merits of this argument, this Circuit has rejected it." (footnote omitted)). Set-
ting aside the obvious fact that Pierce is not binding outside the Second Circuit, Calabresi's
reading of Pierce was strained. Rather than discussing the judicial competency justification
underlying the revenue rule, the Pierce court merely concluded that in wire fraud prosecu-
tions involving schemes to defraud foreign governments of tax revenues, the United States
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a foreign law creating a property
right. See Pierce, 224 F.3d at 166 ("[W]ithout evidence that Canada imposes duty on im-
ported liquor in the first place, the [U.S.] government cannot prove a scheme to defraud
... because there is no evidence whatsoever of a property right .... ").
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rejection of the judicial competency argument was similarly brief.58
Indeed, courts have made little effort to seriously address the con-
cerns raised by the First and Fourth Circuits pertaining to the ability
of American courts to interpret and apply foreign law.59
II
UNSATISFACTORY ATTEMPTS: RESULTS IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
None of the circuit courts have offered a satisfactory analysis in
considering whether the revenue rule bars mail or wire fraud liability
arising from schemes to defraud foreign governments of excise tax
revenues. The following cases address, to varying degrees, the three
traditional justifications underlying the revenue rule, and more im-
portantly, apply these rationales to the present context. In addition,
while many of the arguments raised by the circuit courts prove to be
flawed, they implicate, at least tangentially, a majority of the issues
that will be explored below. 60
A. First Circuit: United States v. Boots
The First Circuit's decision in Boots6 marked the first time that a
circuit court addressed the question of whether wire fraud liability
could exist where the object of the fraudulent scheme was a foreign
government's tax revenues. 62 In Boots, the United States alleged that
the defendants carried out a scheme to smuggle tobacco into Canada
through a Native American reservation in Maine, thereby avoiding im-
port taxes at the Canadian border.63 At the time, Canadian law levied
taxes and excise duties on imports of tobacco. 64 The defendants alleg-
edly smuggled approximately 1,850 kilograms of tobacco into Canada
over the course of a series of operations without paying any of the
required taxes or duties. 65 The Government's theory at trial was that
the defendants' scheme, which involved the use of interstate wire
communications, 66 defrauded Canada and the Province of Nova Sco-
tia of excise duties and tax revenues due at the time the defendants
58 See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1997). Indeed, until
Pierce it appeared that the Second Circuit might not recognize the legal impossibility de-
fense at all in this context. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 70, 91-93 and accompanying text.
60 See infra Part III.
61 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).
62 Id. at 586-87.
63 Id. at 583.
64 [d.
65 See id. at 584.
66 At trial, the Government introduced evidence of four interstate telephone conver-
sations between a woman involved in the scheme and an individual working undercover
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See id.
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transported tobacco across the border. 67 Although the defendants
were initially convicted of wire fraud, 68 the court of appeals reversed,
concluding that the revenue rule barred prosecution under the Gov-
ernment's theory because upholding the convictions "would amount
functionally to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and tax
laws. "69
In justifying its conclusion, the First Circuit asserted that uphold-
ing the Government's theory would require trial courts "to pass on
defendants' challenges to [foreign tax] laws and any claims not to
have violated or intended to violate them."70 The court reasoned that
requiring American courts to interpret and apply foreign law would
trigger the "concerns underlying the revenue rule."71 Specifically, the
Boots court posited that judicial involvement in this area might under-
mine the "foreign policymaking powers" of the legislative and execu-
tive branches.72 In further support of its holding, the First Circuit
noted that the federal statute which criminalizes smuggling goods into
foreign countries does not apply unless the foreign government has a
reciprocal law,73 concluding that applying the wire fraud statute in
these situations would "threaten[ ] the reciprocity provision in [the
anti-smuggling statute]."74 Finally, the court relied on the rule of len-
ity to incorporate the revenue rule into § 1343, reasoning that such
incorporation constituted a more forgiving construction of the
statute. 75
B. Second Circuit: United States v. Trapilo
In Trapilo,76 the Second Circuit squarely rejected the Boots ratio-
nale, 77 holding that the revenue rule did not affect the federal wire
67 Id.
68 The defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and other offenses. Id. at 582-83.
69 Id. at 587 ("The scheme to defraud.., had as its sole object the violation of Cana-
dian revenue laws.").
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 587-88.
73 fd -t 588 (citing 19 11. C. § 546 (1994)).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 588-89. As this Note will argue in Part IIl, application of the revenue rule in
this context would promote none of the policy reasons supporting its existence. See Neder
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (refusing to incorporate common law principles that
were "clearly ... inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted" into the federal fraud
statutes). Therefore, the rule of lenity has no relevance to the present discussion, since the
revenue rule cannot plausibly be read into the mail or wire fraud statutes. See Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 66 (1997) ("The rule [of lenity] does not apply when a statute is
unambiguous or when invoked to engraft an illogical requirement to its text.").
76 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997).
77 Id. at 547, 548-49, 550-51 (reinstating the indictment after the district court, rely-
ing on Boots, had granted defendants' motion to dismiss).
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fraud provision, because under that statute "[t] he identity and loca-
tion of the victim . . . [is] irrelevant." 78 The indictment alleged that
the defendants had engaged in financial transactions to promote a
scheme to defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue in viola-
tion of the money laundering conspiracy provisions. 79 The indict-
ment named wire fraud as the specified unlawful activity, 0 thereby
requiring the Second Circuit to address Boots. Restricting its analysis
to the face of the wire fraud statute, the court summarily dismissed the
notion that the common law revenue rule applied; "[t]he statute
neither expressly, nor impliedly, precludes the prosecution of a
scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue."si In accor-
dance with this conclusion, the Second Circuit reinstated the indict-
ment, which had been dismissed by the district court.8 2
Relying on the statutory language "any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud",83 the court found no ambiguity whatsoever, concluding that
all fraudulent schemes fell within the statute's scope.8 4 In the Second
Circuit's view, the plain language rendered any discussion of the reve-
nue rule irrelevant.8 5 The court argued that "what is proscribed [by
the wire fraud statute] is use of the telecommunication systems of the
United States in furtherance of a [fraudulent] scheme," and therefore
"[t]he identity and location of the victim . .. are irrelevant."86
C. Fourth Circuit: United States v. Pasquantino
The most recent installment of this trio culminated with an en
banc review by the Fourth Circuit of Pasquantino .87 In Pasquantino I,
a panel of the Fourth Circuit agreed with the reasoning in Boots and
78 Id. at 552 ("The statute reaches any scheme to defraud . . . whether the scheme
seeks to undermine a sovereign's right to impose taxes, or involves foreign victims and
governments." (citations omitted)).
79 Id. at 549; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
80 See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549. In order for the federal money laundering statute to
apply, the funds "laundered" must have been derived from one of the predicate crimes
referenced in the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (2002).
81 Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551 ("[T]he common law revenue rule, inapplicable to the
instant case, provides no justification for departing from the plain meaning of the stat-
ute."). But cf. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103,
126-27 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the revenue rule was "well established" when Con-
gress enacted RICO, and that absent an express statement to the contrary courts must
presume that Congress intended to incorporate the revenue rule into RICO), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1000 (2002).
82 Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 550-51.
83 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added).
84 See Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 551.
85 See id. The court applied the same reasoning in determining that discussion of the
rule of lenity was inappropriate. See id. at 552 n.8.
86 Id. at 552.
87 305 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and reh'g en banc granted by 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 585 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003); see Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003).
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held that the revenue rule precluded the Government's theory of wire
fraud.88 However, in Pasquantino II, the en banc Fourth Circuit re-
versed the panel's decision and reinstated the defendants'
convictions. 89
The defendants had been convicted of developing a scheme
through which they avoided heavy Canadian taxes and duties on alco-
hol by purchasing liquor in Maryland and smuggling it into Canada
through New York.90 In reversing the convictions, the panel expressly
rejected the Trapilo court's reasoning,91 and observed that "in order to
determine whether Canada was deprived of property (tax revenues), a
determination must be made into whether Canada's tax laws were in
fact broken, or were intended to be broken."92 This would require
American courts to decide, for example, whether Canadian law sup-
ported a defendant's claim of legal impossibility, and any such deci-
sion, the panel held, would violate the revenue rule. 9-3
Over a two-judge dissent, an en banc Fourth Circuit reversed the
panel's decision, holding that the revenue rule did not bar wire fraud
prosecutions of this type. 94 After initially concluding that Congress
could not have intended to carve out these schemes from the wire
fraud statute because, in the court's view, the revenue rule did not
preclude the recognition of foreign revenue laws at common law, 95 the
court partially reversed its course, reasoning that the revenue rule
does apply where the imposition of liability "would be the functional
equivalent of enforcing the revenue laws of [foreign governments] ."96
However, the majority ultimately determined that since prosecutions
of this type "vindicat[e] our government's substantial interest in
preventing our nation's interstate wire communication systems from
being used in furtherance of criminal fraudulent enterprises," the
"functional equivalent" exception was inapplicable. 97
Envisioning the issue as one with jurisdictional underpinnings,
the Fourth Circuit felt obliged to respond to the separation of powers
issue. 98 The court concluded that no separation of powers problem
88 305 F.3d at 296, 298, rev'd en banc, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003).
89 See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 331, 337-38.
9 SeA M-........ 1.^^ 9, F..d at -a ., A-,- .A --^_.U^ilL , CIE. ... ..-- 1. U1 -I .. I.
element of wire fraud because they frequently made telephone orders to a store in Mary-
land from Niagara Falls, New York. See id. at 293 n.3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
91 See Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 297-98.
92 Id. at 298.
93 See id.
94 Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 331. The court also rejected the argument that accrued
tax revenues are not a cognizable property right for purposes of the wire fraud statute. See
id. at 331-33. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
95 See id. at 330.
96 Id.; see supra note 5.
97 See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 331.
98 Id.
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existed here because both the legislative (by enacting the wire fraud
statute) and the executive (through the United States Attorney's deci-
sion to seek an indictment) branches, "the only two branches of our
federal government charged by our Constitution with the power to
make foreign policy decisions," approved of the prosecution.9
Judge Gregory, writing for the dissent, criticized the majority's
narrow construction of the revenue rule,100 relying predominantly on
language in two Supreme Court cases-Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino'01 and Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.102-for the proposi-
tion that the revenue rule applies to the recognition of foreign tax
judgments as well as to the underlying statutes.10 3 The dissent also
criticized the majority's conclusion that the evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to establish the amount of taxes owed on the liquor
brought into Canada,10 4 on the grounds that the testimony of a lay
witness was not a valid proxy for a legal finding by the district court.10 5
III
PROPER RECONCILIATION: REJECTING PREVAILING JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR APPLICATION OF THE REVENUE RULE
Recognizing the existence of scholarship questioning the revenue
rule or calling for its complete abrogation, this Note will not add to
99 Id. (citation omitted).
100 Judge Gregory's initial challenge to the majority's decision is the claim that the
court "reads the words 'to recognize' completely out of the Restatement section on which it
purportedly relies." See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 338 (Gregory, J. dissenting). Although
Section 483 of the Restatement does in fact contain the phrase "to recognize," that phrase
modifies the subsequent language "judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties
rendered by the courts of other states." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 483 (1987). That is, Section 483 applies to the recognition or enforcement of judgments,
as opposed to the recognition or enforcement of laws. Insofar as the present issues in-
volves the propriety of recognizing foreign tax laws, therefore, the majority's conclusion
that Section 483 is inapplicable is correct. Of course, as Judge Gregory subsequent reli-
ance on Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates, see infra notes 101-03, 109 and accompa-
nying text, the Restatement of Foreign Relations is far from the last word on the scope of the
revenue rule in the United States.
101 376 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1964) (stating that the "principle enunciated in federal and
state cases" is that courts "need not give effect to the. .. revenue laws of foreign countries"
(emphasis added)).
102 296 U.S. 268, 274 (1935) ("It has often been said, and in a few cases held, that
statutes imposing taxes are not entitled to full faith and credit." (footnotes omitted)).
103 See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 338 (Gregory, J., dissenting) ("[L]ong before Con-
gress' [s] passage of the wire fraud statute ... , 'the United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the broad scope of the revenue rule.'" (quoting Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 126 (2d Cir. 2001))).
104 See id. at 342 (Gregory,J., dissenting) ("By alleging the existence of foreign revenue
laws, the government effectively conceded that the applicability of Canadian law was cen-
tral to its case.").
105 See id. at 343 ("The district court never determined whether OfficerJonah's calcula-
tions were accurate as a matter of Canadian law.").
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the criticism of the ancient common law maxim.10 6 Rather, this Note
will contend that the policies advanced in support of the revenue rule
are not promoted by employing it as a bar to federal mail and wire
fraud prosecutions, and therefore the revenue rule should not apply
to preclude prosecutions for those offenses where the scheme alleged
attempts to defraud foreign governments of import duties or excise
taxes.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that none of the trio of
circuit court cases discussed properly addressed or disposed of the
precise question presented. That is, while the Pasquantino IP07 and
Trapilo10 8 opinions arrived at the correct result, they failed to properly
address the policy concerns that support the revenue rule, most no-
ticeably providing no defensible reason for rejecting the judicial com-
petency concerns raised by the First Circuit.10 9
Accordingly, this Note will follow the approach taken by Judge
Calabresi in his R.J. Reynolds dissent,"l0 addressing each of the three
prevailing justifications for applying the revenue rule in this context
and rejecting each in turn."' With respect to the third and final justi-
fication-concerning the federal judiciary's ability to interpret and
apply foreign law-this Note will specifically address (a) the legal im-
possibility defense and (b) the determination of sentencing exposure
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In short, this Note will at-
tempt to complete the task Judge Calabresi initiated in his R.J. Reyn-
olds dissent-systematically rejecting each of the three justifications
most frequently offered in support of applying the revenue rule in the
present context.112
106 See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 161, 176-83
(2002); Kovatch, supra note 9.
107 336 F.3d 321.
108 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 70, 91-93. In addition, Pasquantino II adds the
unnecessary confusion and uncertainty of relying upon a narrowed scope of the revenue
rule. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. As the dissent in that case pointed out,
the Fourth Circuit's decision broke ranks with both the First and Second Circuits, which
had previously defined the revenue rule more broadly, see Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at
338-40 (Gregory, J., dissenting), and arguably ignored the express understanding of the
Supreme Court, see supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. This Note does not at-
tempt to determine whether the Fourth Circuit's reading of the revenue rule is correct.
Instead, this Note attempts to provide a more readily defensible basis for rejecting applica-
tion of the revenue rule in the present context.
110 268 F.3d 103, 135-41 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1000 (2002).
111 See id. (CalabresiJ., dissenting). Although Judge Calabresi provides a useful frame-
work for analyzing the issues involved, this Note does not express any opinion as to his
conclusion that the revenue rule should not operate as a bar to civil RICO suits initiated by
foreign governments. See id. at 135 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 135-41 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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A. Respect for National Sovereignty
A great deal of conceptual difficulty surrounds the notion that a
criminal prosecution, initiated by the United States government in
federal court and arising from a violation of United States law, may
nevertheless constitute an infringement by a foreign government
upon the sovereign power of the United States. Indeed, but for the
fact that federal prosecutions of this type have the coincidental effect
of deterring further crimes against a foreign government, any discus-
sion concerning this justification for the revenue rule would be un-
necessary. However, in light of the misguided views expressed by the
Boots court, 1 3 this issue warrants some consideration.
Congress enacted the mail and wire fraud provisions to prevent
the use of the Nation's postal and wire services to further fraudulent
schemes.' 14 Based on this understanding, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the possibility of a prosecution under state law arising
from the underlying scheme does not preclude federal indictment
pursuant to §§ 1341 or 1343.11 5 The validity of this result flows from
the distinction between the aims of state-law fraud statutes and the
federal provisions-the former seek to proscribe the mischievous plot
itself, while the latter are targeted at the methods employed to carry it
out. 16 Properly understood, therefore, the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes do not enforce state crimes; instead, they proscribe ac-
tivities that, while simultaneously implicating state law, threaten spe-
cific, Congressionally defined federal interests."t 7
Ironically, the relationship between the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes and the federal antismuggling statute discussed in Boots illustrates
this crucial distinction."l 8 Whereas the antismuggling statute is inap-
113 See supra Part II.A.
114 See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1960) (discussing the mail
fraud statute); United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing the
wire fraud statute). Of course, one might assert that the federal fraud statutes are not
really about preventing misuse of the mails or wires at all but instead represent a means for
expanding the federal government's role as a law enforcement body. See, e.g., O'SULLVAN,
supra note 2, at 305-06 ("Some judges and many commentators... have expressed discom-
fort with the virtually limitless scope of these statutes, noting ... the extent to which they
have been used to attack conduct that was previously considered the province of local law
enforcement.. . ."). While these concerns regarding the federalization of criminal law in
the United States may be valid, "[the] aggrandizement of federal jurisdiction ... has met
no substantial resistance in Congress or public opinion, and little in the courts." Gerard E.
Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661, 745 (1987)
(footnotes omitted). So long as Congress and the judiciary continue to recognize implic-
itly the federal interest in protecting misuse of the mails or wires, there is no plausible
reason for carving out an exception in this context.
115 See, e.g., Parr, 363 U.S. at 389.
116 See, e.g., id. at 389-90.
1'7 See id at 389.
118 See supra text accompanying note 73.
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plicable where the adversely affected foreign government's laws do
not contain reciprocal prohibitions,' 19 no such limitation is contained
within §§ 1341 or 1343. In the context of international smuggling,
these provisions combine to prohibit two entirely discrete activities
under federal law: (1) defrauding a foreign government of earned tax
revenues 120 and (2) using the mails or interstate wires in an impermis-
sible manner, specifically for the purpose of defrauding a foreign gov-
ernment.' 21 The implications of this distinction are fundamental to
understanding the proper role of the revenue rule in this area.
By enacting § 546, Congress expressed its willingness to assist fel-
low members of the international community in the task of combating
transnational smuggling, provided that the United States received a
quid pro quo. In this context, a reciprocity requirement makes sense.
Without obtaining the assistance of foreign authorities in reducing
the amount of smuggling into the United States, the antismuggling
statute would not promote any federal interest. Section 546 consti-
tutes an open ended offer to foreign nations-help the United States
enforce its tax laws, and it will help you enforce your own. 122
In contrast, application of §§ 1341 or 1343, in the context of in-
ternational smuggling activities, serves federal interests regardless of
whether the nation defrauded would criminalize similar operations
against the United States. Here, as with the paradigmatic prosecution
arising from state law fraud, the federal interest entails preventing the
misuse of the mails or wires within the borders of the United States.' 23
Unlike § 546, reciprocity is not required to effectuate the congres-
sional objectives embodied in the mail and wire fraud provisions, be-
cause the interests that they serve can be achieved without the
assistance of foreign governments.
Aside from alleviating the First Circuit's concern that applying
the mail and wire fraud statutes in this context would undermine the
reciprocity provision of § 546,124 an understanding of the distinct con-
gressional objectives embodied in these statutes dispels the notion
that attaching mail or wire fraud liability under these circumstances
"risks turning federal prosecutors and investigators into de facto crim-
119 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2000) (prohibiting the smuggling of goods out of the United
States in violation of a foreign government's law, if that nation's laws proscribe "violation
of the laws of the United States respecting the customs revenue").
120 Id.
121 Id. §§ 1341, 1343.
122 Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that prosecutions under § 546, to borrow the
language of the Boots court, "amount functionally to penal enforcement of [foreign] cus-
toms and tax laws." See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996). The First
Circuit's mistake, however, was in failing to recognize the fundamental differences be-
tween the federal interests promoted by § 1343, as compared to § 546.
123 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
124 See Boots, 80 F.3d at 588.
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inal law enforcement agents for foreign tax authorities. ' 125 Just as the
principles of federalism do not preclude the United States govern-
ment from charging mail or wire fraud when the fraud deprives a state
of tax revenues, 126 the revenue rule should not prevent similar prose-
cutions when the mails or wires of the United States are used improp-
erly to further international fraud. In either instance, the primary
interest being promoted is that of the federal government, 127 and any
benefit that inures to another jurisdiction is entirely secondary and
coincidental.1 2 3
Nevertheless, the First Circuit remains concerned that recogniz-
ing mail and wire fraud liability in these circumstances creates the risk
that foreign governments will use the American criminal justice sys-
tem to further policies, embedded in their tax laws, that are funda-
mentally opposed to the prevailing social policies of the United
States. 129 The reality, however, is that the position adopted by the cir-
cuits that apply the revenue rule in this context has the perverse effect
of preventing the federal government from promoting its own policies
and interests. 130 When the United States initiates a criminal proceed-
ing charging the misuse of the mails or wires in connection with a
scheme to deprive a foreign government of tax revenues, it has affirm-
atively indicated that the foreign tax laws evaded are in fact "conso-
nant with [the executive branch's] own notions of what is proper."131
125 Kathryn Keneally, The U.S. Prosecutes Foreign Tax Evasion as a Domestic Crime-With
Far-Reaching Consequences, 88J. TAx'N 224, 229 (1998), quoted in Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d 291,
297 (4th Cir. 2002); vacated and reh'gen banc granted by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 585 (4th Cir.
Jan 14, 2003).
126 See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960) ("The fact that a scheme
may violate state laws does not exclude it from the proscriptions of the federal mail fraud
statute .... ."); United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[The] focus [of
§ 1343] is upon the misuse of the wires, not the regulation of state affairs.").
127 See Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d 321, 330-31 (4th Cir. 2003).
128 See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Whether our deci-
sion [that the revenue rule does not bar a prosecution in this context] indirectly assists our
... neighbors in keeping smugglers at bay or assists them in the collection of taxes, is not
our [court's] concern."); see also Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 299 (Hamilton, J., dissenting)
("[T]he fact that the property at issue .. .belonged to foreign governments... is merely
incidental to the application of the federal wire fraud statute.").
129 See Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 297 ("The revenue rule allows [American] courts to
avoid becoming ensnared in the difficult decisions concerning which foreign tax laws we,
through criminal prosecutions [in the United States], will help to enforce." (footnote
omitted)); Boots, 80 F.3d at 587 ("Foreign customs and tax frauds are intertwined with
enforcement of a foreign sovereign's own laws and policies to raise and collect such reve-
nues-laws with which [the United States] may or may not be in sympathy ....").
130 See Brief for Appellant at 15-16, United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir.
1997) (No. 97-1011) ("[J]udicially barring this prosecution will prevent the executive
branch from . . .protecting the integrity of the United States['] telecommunications ...
systems . . ").
131 Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 297 (quoting Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir.
1929) (Hand, J., concurring)). But see Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d at 330-31; supra text accom-
panying notes 43-45.
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Indeed, without such a prior determination, the Department of Jus-
tice would have no basis for concluding that the manner in which a
defendant used the mails or wires was actually improper, or more im-
portantly, that the federal prosecution arising from such activity
would be in the United States' interests. Therefore, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, not an unwarranted expansion of the reve-
nue rule, will ultimately enable the federal judiciary "to avoid becom-
ing ensnared in the difficult decisions concerning which foreign tax
laws [they] . . . will help to enforce." 13 2
A different situation arises when the foreign nation itself brings a
civil suit under U.S. law to recover damages flowing from tax eva-
sion. 133 In that instance, federal prosecutors have played no role in
bringing the claim and therefore have made no determination that
allowing the suit to go forward would promote the interests of the
United States. 13 4 This is precisely the situation that the national sover-
eignty justification for the revenue rule contemplates: placing the ju-
diciary in the position of determining whether the policies underlying
a foreign tax law are consistent with those of the United States.1 35
When the case involves criminal charges, however, these concerns are
not implicated. This distinction explains recent arguments made by
the Department of Justice to the United States Supreme Court, con-
tending that the revenue rule should apply to bar civil RICO claims by
foreign governments because the opportunity for prosecutorial discre-
tion does not exist. t3 6
132 Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 297 (footnote omitted).
133 There have been several attempts by foreign governments to recover fraudulently
withheld tax revenues by utilizing RICO's civil remedy provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2000) (providing that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962" shall have a claim for treble damages in federal court); see, e.g.,
Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the revenue rule barred a foreign government's claim under RICO to re-
cover fraudulently withheld tax revenues), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002); Republic of
Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (same). Although this
Note expresses no ultimate opinion on this issue, see supra note 111 and accompanying
text, there is a compelling argu ment that the filing of a civil RICO action in federal court
by a defrauded foreign nation directly implicates the national sovereignty interests that the
revenue rule furthers. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
134 See Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (noting that while "[i]n criminal
RICO cases, the United States Attorney makes the decision to bring the case," no such
decision is made in the civil context, where "the foreign sovereign plaintiff is seeking to
further its own agenda, which may or may not be consistent with that of the United
States").
135 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 01-1317) ("Courts lack
the institutional competence to determine whether enforcement of [a foreign sovereign's]
claims would serve the interests of the United States .... ).
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B. Separation of Powers
The fear that allowing prosecutions of this type undermines the
constitutionally established balance of power among the federal
branches is unfounded. 137 To the contrary, serious constitutional
concerns arise when the judiciary intervenes to preclude mail and
wire fraud liability in these circumstances, assuming without justifica-
tion that Congress implicitly contemplated such action, and thereby
prohibiting the executive branch from carrying out its fundamental
duty to "take [care] that the [laws] be faithfully executed." 138
When federal prosecutors pursue wire and mail fraud cases in
this context, they properly enforce a congressional mandate to ensure
that United States communications systems are not used to facilitate
fraudulent activities.13 9 Although commentators consistently question
the propriety of equipping prosecutors with such a blunt tool for car-
rying out this objective, 140 Congress has not been persuaded to alter
its course. In fact, Congress has proceeded in precisely the opposite
direction, enacting legislation recognizing that the "intangible right
of honest services" is a cognizable target of fraudulent schemes under
federal law.141 Therefore, absent a demonstration that Congress in-
tended otherwise, there is no justifiable reason to construe §§ 1341
and 1343 narrowly in this situation. 142
137 See supra Part I.B.2.
138 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Pasquantino II, 336 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[A]
significant separation of powers problem would arise were we to play diplomat from the
bench . . . [and] set aside the Defendants' wire fraud convictions and sentences."); Brief
for Appellant at 15, United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997) (No. 97-1011)
("U]udicially barring this prosecution will prevent the executive branch from carrying out
its constitutional obligation to enforce federal law. .. ").
139 See supra notes 99, 114 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., O'SULLVAN, supra note 2, at 305-06 (summarizing the arguments tradi-
tionally advanced to challenge the breadth of the mail and wire fraud statutes).
141 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000); see O'SuLLIVAN, supra note 2, at 305 ("Congress ... has
seemingly evidenced its approval of a broad application of [the federal fraud statutes],
most recently in enacting § 1346 and in amending § 1341 to cover deliveries by private or
commercial interstate carriers."). Indeed, § 1346 effectively overruled the Supreme
Court's opinion in McNay v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), which had held that appli-
cation of the mail fraud statute was limited to schemes targeting property rights.
142 It is entirely possible that by concluding that the revenue rule should apply in this
context, the First and Fourth Circuits were in fact expressing their basic disagreement with
the broad scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Whatever the merits of these statutes
as a general matter, however, the Constitution does not recognize this form of judicial
nullification. See Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d
103, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ("I cannot . . . join an opinion that
applies an old and dubious common law rule, in ways that have nothing to do with its roots
or rationales, in order to limit an act of Congress that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
applied in the broadest possible ways.").
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Contrary to the position taken by the Boots court, 143 the existence
of § 546 does not demonstrate a congressional intent to engraft the
revenue rule onto the mail and wire fraud statutes. These provisions
address two distinct congressional objectives related to international
smuggling operations: proscribing illegal exportation and ensuring
that the mails and wires of the United States are not utilized in fur-
therance of such activities. 144 Therefore, the concern expressed in
Boots is baseless, since the general fraud provisions can be employed in
these circumstances without undermining the goals embodied in the
reciprocity requirement of the antismuggling statute. 145
Equally unconvincing was the First Circuit's apparent reliance on
a presumption that Congress incorporated the revenue rule into the
mail and wire fraud statutes. 146 Following from this presumption, the
Boots court's logic proceeded as follows: The revenue rule applies un-
less Congress says otherwise. Congress did not say otherwise. There-
fore, the revenue rule applies. Assuming, arguendo, that the court's
minor premise was correct, 14 7 the syllogism fails because the major
premise-the court's presumption-assumes the very issue at hand;
that the revenue rule has a role to play in this context. While in cer-
tain circumstances Congress is presumed to have incorporated ele-
ments of the common law into the federal fraud provisions, 14 such
incorporation is only appropriate where the element at issue was an
established component of the common law meaning of fraud. 149
Thus, a presumption that the revenue rule applies to constrain the
scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes would only be appropriate if
the rule would have applied to frauds at common law. This determi-
nation, of course, can only be made by considering whether common
law frauds against foreign governments would implicate the justifica-
143 See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Effect ... cannot be
given to section 1343 . . . without threatening the reciprocity provision in section 546
.... "); see also Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d 291, 296 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with and
quoting Boots, 80 F.3d at 588), vacated and reh ' en banc granted by, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 585
(4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
,45 See supra text accompanying notes i23-28, 143.
146 See Boots, 80 F.3d at 588 ("If Congress . . . had meant to authorize the courts to
enforce this kind of application of the wire fraud statute, we think 'it must speak more
clearly than it has.'" (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360)).
147 The Trapilo court, at least, would challenge this assertion. See United States v.
Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[Section 1343] neither expressly, nor im-
pliedly, precludes the prosecution of a scheme to defraud a foreign government of tax
revenue .... ").
148 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
149 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1999). Although Boots was decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Neder, it is necessary to consider the First Circuit's
reasoning in light of the views subsequendy expressed by a superior court.
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tions underlying the revenue rule. Viewed in this manner, the circu-
larity of the Boots court's reasoning becomes clear.
Absent any plausible argument to the contrary, courts must con-
clude that Congress intended fraudulent schemes seeking to evade
foreign excise taxes to fall within the broadly established scope of
§§ 1341 and 1343.150 Indeed, a modification of the Boots court's lan-
guage is appropriate; if Congress meant not to authorize judicial en-
forcement of this application of the mail and wire fraud statutes, "'it
must speak more clearly than it has.'" 151 Given Congress's continued
belief that protecting the United States' communication systems is a
goal worth pursuing, it is doubtful that any statutory clarification re-
stricting the net cast by the federal fraud statutes is forthcoming. 152
While the legislative branch's blessing must be implicitly gleaned
from the statutes it has enacted, the executive branch unmistakably
authorizes the judiciary to try these cases when it initiates prosecu-
tion. 153 Although the Boots court conceded that the possibility of
prosecutorial discretion alleviates the risk that the judicial branch, by
trying a particular criminal case, will be employed to promote agendas
adverse to American foreign policy,1 5 4 it remained concerned that
"whether conduct is criminal cannot be a determination left solely to
prosecutorial discretion."' 155 Once again, however, this concern repre-
sents an indictment of the mail and wire fraud statutes themselves,
rather than a criticism of the application of those statutes in the pre-
sent context. 156 In short, so long as the federal prosecutor maintains
control over the commencement of litigation, there is no risk that the
150 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 304-05 (discussing the "infinite malleability" of the
federal fraud statutes).
151 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
152 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) (indicating Congress's intention to expand the realm
of crimes encompassed by §§ 1341 and 1343, rather than restrict it); O'SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, at 305 (noting that Congress has "seemingly evidenced its approval of a broad
application of these statutes").
153 As the Second Circuit properly recognized, "[w]hen the United States prosecutes a
criminal action, the United States Attorney acts in the interest of the United States, and his
or her conduct is subject to the oversight of the executive branch." Attorney Gen. of Can.
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 123 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1000 (2002).
154 See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Prosecutors ... might
of course be expected not to pursue wire fraud prosecutions based on smuggling schemes
aimed at blatantly hostile countries ... .
155 Id.
156 This criticism of the application of the fraud statutes has been made with particular
force in cases where the fraud alleged involves not an affirmative misrepresentation, but
rather the breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose information. See, e.g., WilliamJ. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 505, 524 (2001) ("[T]he federal mail
and wire fraud statutes . . . criminalize, basically, all serious breaches of fiduciary duty.
Given the inevitable disagreement about what is and [is not] serious, that means federal
fraud statutes criminalize an enormous amount of wrongful but not paradigmatically crimi-
nal behavior." (footnote omitted)).
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judiciary will proceed in a manner inconsistent with the executive
branch's foreign policy goals. 157
C. Judicial Competency
The Boots court relied, at least implicitly, on concerns of judicial
competency in concluding that the revenue rule should bar prosecu-
tions of international smuggling operations under the federal mail
and wire fraud statutes. 158 The court did not, however, engage in any
meaningful discussion of precisely why, in its view, American federal
courts would be unable to interpret and apply foreign tax laws in this
context. 159 On the other hand, the Pasquantino and Trapilo courts'
responses to these concerns were entirely inadequate.160 Moreover,
none of these opinions recognized or discussed the possible signifi-
cance of the district court's duty, following a conviction, to ascertain
the extent of the loss resulting from the fraud when determining the
appropriate sentencing range.' 61
1. Legal Impossibility
For all inchoate crimes, 162 liability becomes possible once the de-
fendant formulates the intent to commit a criminal act, regardless of
157 Cf Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364-65 (S.D.
Fla. 2002) ("An adjudication of Ecuador's [civil RICO] claims would eliminate Ecuador's
incentive to negotiate a tax treaty with the [executive]."). Of course, the fear that "the
[executive's] ability to secure reciprocity of U.S. tax claims in Ecuador could be under-
mined if the [judiciary] did not adhere to the principal of noninterference," id. at 1365
(citation omitted), is further alleviated in the criminal context because the foreign govern-
ment does not recover anything following a successful mail or wire fraud prosecution.
158 See supra Part II.A.
159 Common sense indicates that the difficulties associated with applying foreign tax
laws will vary depending on the context. Were a foreign government permitted to seek
direct enforcement of its income tax laws in American courts, for example, one familiar
with the Internal Revenue Code might imagine that the court would encounter a complex
morass of provisions, exemptions, and exceptions, accompanied by potentially limitless evi-
dence regarding financial statements and transactions. In contrast, it is a far less daunting
task for an American court to determine whether certain goods are subject to excise tax
upon importation into a foreign country. In the latter case, the issue involves a much
more contained transaction, isolated in both time and space.
possibility was not a valid defense to mail or wire fraud. See supra note 25 and accompany-
ing text. In Pasquantino II, however, the Fourth Circuit managed to avoid the issue
altogether by reaching the antecedent conclusion that the revenue rule applies only to the
recognition of judgments. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The Pasquantino II court was faced with a
sentencing issue on appeal, concluding that the district court's finding as to fraud loss,
which was based on the lay testimony of a Canadian officer, was not clearly erroneous. See
336 F.3d 321, 336-38 (4th Cir.2003). The court's analysis on this point, however, does not
constitute a response to the contention that an American court is not competent to make
such a finding in the first instance.
162 Both mail and wire fraud are inchoate offenses. See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at
304; see, e.g., JosHuA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 984 (2d ed. 1999).
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whether the act planned is ever carried out successfully.163 The de-
fense of legal impossibility, however, is available as an absolute bar to
liability in appropriate situations. 164 In order to alleviate the risk of
confusion, it seems appropriate at the outset to define what is meant
by the term "legal impossibility." Therefore, for purposes of this Note,
legal impossibility refers to situations where the objective the defen-
dant sought to accomplish would not have violated the law, although
the defendant himself believed that his intended conduct would con-
stitute a crime. 165 In explaining this principle, the Third Circuit has
cited the example that "a hunter cannot be convicted of attempting to
shoot a deer if the law does not prohibit shooting deer in the first
place."'1 66 However, if shooting deer were a crime, the hunter would
be liable for attempt if he fired at a stuffed deer believing it to be
alive. 167
Given this understanding, it becomes clear that the concept of
legal impossibility is relevant to this discussion. 168 In Boots, for exam-
ple, the legal impossibility defense would have been available if Cana-
dian law had not in fact imposed any tax on imported tobacco. 69
Indeed, but for the existence of such a tax, no property right would
have vested in favor of the Canadian government when the tobacco
was transported across its border.1 70  In the absence of a property
163 The act required to perfect liability depends on the specific inchoate crime. In the
case of mail and wire fraud, a mailing or communication in furtherance of the fraudulent
scheme is sufficient. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 & n.16 (3d Cir. 1998) (referring to
these situations as instances of "pure" legal impossibility); Ira P. Robbins, Attempting the
Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 389 (1986) (same) (citing
Fernand N. Dutile & Harold F. Moore, Mistake and Impossibility: Arranging a Marriage Between
Two Difficult Partners, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 166, 184 (1979)).
166 Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199 n.16.
167 This example assumes, of course, that the defendant acted with the necessary
mental state. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1) (a) (1962) (defining "attempt" to include
situations where a defendant "engages in conduct that would constitute [a] crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be"). The Trapilo court was clearly
referring to this type of situation when it proclaimed that "legal impossibility affords a
conspirator no defense." United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 552 n.9 (2d Cir. 1997).
Certainly the Second Circuit did not intend to imply that it would uphold convictions for
conspiracy to wear plaid, no matter how convinced the conspirators were that the law pro-
scribed such conduct. See United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) ("We
did not say or suggest in Trapilo ... that a guilty mind without something about which to
feel guilty was a crime.").
168 Despite what the Second Circuit may have insinuated in Trapilo, see supra note 26
and accompanying text, it is now clear that all three of the circuits to address the revenue
rule issue in this context have concluded that legal impossibility would be a valid defense.
See Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh'g en banc granted by, 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 585 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003); Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167; United States v. Boots,
80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996).
169 For a summary of the facts in Boots, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
170 See Pasquantino I, 305 F.3d at 298.
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right, there could be no fraud, since nothing of value would have
been taken from Canada and nothing to which it had become entitled
would have been withheld.1 71
Therefore, the critical inquiry is whether American courts are
competent to rule on prospective defendants' claims that the tax laws
they allegedly violated did not exist, did not apply in their case, or
were invalid and therefore inapplicable as a general matter. 172 While
federal courts frequently apply foreign law in other contexts,173 their
hesitance to deal with other nations' tax laws is not surprising. In-
deed, the perceived complexity of the U.S. tax code prompted the
Supreme Court to interpret certain federal criminal tax laws as requir-
ing proof of specific intent, thereby creating an exception to the fre-
quently stated maxim that "ignorance of the law ... is no defense.' ' 74
However, there is a fundamental difference between allowing an indi-
vidual who misreads a tax law to escape liability and permitting an
entire class of individuals to avoid prosecution because the judiciary is
unwilling to interpret unfamiliar law.
An examination of federal law indicates that Congress believes
the judiciary is capable of interpreting foreign law in criminal cases.
Specifically, the federal antismuggling statute proscribes smuggling or
attempting to smuggle, in the statutorily defined manner, "any mer-
chandise into the territory of any foreign government in violation of
the laws there in force, if under the laws of such foreign government
any penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the
United States respecting the customs revenue."' 75 This provision re-
quires two distinct inquires into foreign law to perfect liability: (1)
does foreign law permit the manner in which the defendant brought
merchandise into that country?; and (2) do the foreign country's laws
include a reciprocal antismuggling statute? In essence, the first of
these inquiries is a codification of the legal impossibility defense; if
the foreign nation's law does permit the manner in which the defen-
dant brought his merchandise into that country, then no smuggling
171 See Pierce, 224 F.3d at 167-68.
172 .gee Pasqiantinn 1. 305 F.3d at 298 ("[P] rosecuting a defendant for violations of a
law, or for attempting to violate that law, requires an inquiry into the applicability and
validity of the law.").
173 See, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 546 F.2d 26 (1977) (holding that
under the applicable choice of law rules, the district court should have applied Cambodian
law to the plaintiff's tort claim).
174 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-201 (1991); see also id. at 200 (noting that
the "special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax
laws").
175 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2000). The Boots court relied in part on § 546 to justify its reversal
of wire fraud convictions flowing from a scheme to smuggle tobacco into Canada. See
United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1996). For a criticism of the First Circuit's
discussion of § 546, see supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
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has occurred, regardless of what the defendant may have believed. By
promulgating § 546, Congress explicitly rejected the argument that
American courts are incapable of interpreting and applying foreign
tax laws. Instead, § 546 requires that the judiciary engage in such
processes. 176
At least one federal court faced with a § 546 prosecution has suc-
cessfully run the (alleged) gauntlet of foreign law, thereby validating
Congress's confidence in the judiciary's abilities. In United States v.
Miller,t 77 the district court held that a Canadian statute failed to satisfy
the reciprocity requirement as a matter of law, and thus dismissed a
charge of conspiracy to violate § 546.178 In the course of its discus-
sion, the court relied heavily on an opinion of the Canadian Supreme
Court construing the statutory provision at issue. 179 This enabled the
American court to move beyond the face of the foreign statute in as-
certaining the statute's proper scope.180
If the Miller court's approach for interpreting Canadian law
seems familiar, you've probably gone to law school. After all, the dis-
trictjudge's method of construing statutory law in light of judicial in-
terpretations is utilized on a daily basis in courtrooms across the
United States. The reality, of course, is that in the overwhelming ma-
jority of these cases the prosecution will rely on expert testimony to
prove the existence of foreign laws creating the requisite property
rights. 81 In those situations, the trial court will only be asked to de-
termine whether a reasonable jury,. based on the evidence presented
at trial, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that an excise tax exis-
ted.18 2 While the possibility exists that future defendants might raise
claims that superceding foreign law invalidated the excise statute cre-
ating the property right,183 it seems clear, as a practical matter, that
176 This Note does not contend that § 546 alone suffices to demonstrate a congres-
sional intent to render the revenue rule inapplicable to the mail and wire fraud statutes.
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 n.7 (1999) (indicating that analogizing to other
federal statutes is insufficient to rebut the presumption that Congress intended to incorpo-
rate aspects of the common law into the mail and wire fraud statutes). However, § 546
does manifest Congress' belief that American courts are competent to deal with foreign tax
laws.
177 26 F. Supp. 2d 415 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
178 See id. at 425-26.
179 See id.
180 See id. (citing Bolduc v. Attorney Gen. of Que., [1982] S.C.R. 573).
181 See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
182 See United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000).
183 Cheek raised a related, but distinguishable, claim involving American tax laws.
There, the defendant challenged his conviction for attempting to evade taxes on the
ground that he acted with the sincere belief that he was not a "taxpayer" within the mean-
ing of the Internal Revenue Code, and that wages were not "income." See Cheek v. United
States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991). In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that although Cheek's reading of the Constitution was objectively "irrational," if he
honestly believed that his conduct was lawful, he was not acting willfully as required by the
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
this contingency is far too tenuous to merit concern. Indeed, even if a
non-trivial challenge to the validity of a foreign nation's import tax
existed, it would certainly have been raised in and considered by that
nation's courts in proceedings to enforce their import laws directly.18 4
Concerns that American courts would be incapable of adjudicating
such challenges are therefore illusory.'8 5
Following the Supreme Court's holding in Cheek,186 however, a
court might be faced with the argument that while an excise tax did in
fact apply to the goods imported, the defendant operated with the
good faith belief that no such tax existed or applied.' 8 7 Assuming that
a Cheek-type defense was even cognizable in this context,1 8 8 interna-
tional smugglers clearly would be precluded from availing themselves
of its protection. 189 Consider the following description of the meth-
ods that the defendants in Pasquantino employed:
[T] he liquor was loaded into the trunks of cars and driven over the
border .... One car seized as part of the scheme was a 1985 Ford
Crown Victoria with industrial-strength shock absorbers controlled
by an air valve installed discreetly under the rear bumper....
[The Royal Canadian Mounted Police] found 280 1.75 liter bottles
of alcohol in the trunk, weighing about a thousand pounds ....
The car rode about five inches high when empty, but hunkered
down into a normal profile when fully loaded .... 190
The sophisticated, illicit means used by these defendants to "trans-
port" their goods across the border plainly defeat any claim that they
statute. Id. at 204-05. Ajury instruction to the contrary was therefore improper. See id. at
203, 206-07. Critically, however, the Court held that a good faith belief that the tax was
unconstitutional and therefore invalid could not be a defense. See id. at 206.
184 For example, the defendants in Pasquantino I were also indicted in Canada for
crimes arising from their smuggling operation. See 305 F.3d 291, 293 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002),
vacated and reh'g en banc granted by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 585 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003).
185 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
186 498 U.S. 192.
187 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
188 As a threshold matter, a strong argument can be made that Cheek's rationale should
not apply outside its original context (cases involving the alleged violation of federal crimi-
nal tax offcnsc. that expressly require a- finding of wilfvllness). See Cheek 498 U.S. at
199-200 ("Congress has ... softened the impact of the common[-]law presumption [that
everyone knows the law] by making specific intent to violate the law an element of certain
federal criminal tax offenses.").
189 It is important to note, however, that Cheek itself foreclosed the possibility of a de-
fense alleging a good-faith belief that a foreign tax law was wholly invalid. See supra note
183 and accompanying text. Therefore, the defendants' claim in Boots that they operated
"with a good faith belief in an aboriginal right to trade tobacco freely with Canada" would
have afforded no defense. See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 584 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 905 (1996). The defendants in Boots conceded an understanding that
Canada claimed a right to tax their activities. Id.
190 Andrew Z. Galarneau, A Dozen Charged as Officials Bust Smuggling Ring, BUFF. NEws,
May 6, 2000, at B5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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were unaware, in good faith, that an excise tax was due.t91 Presented
with these facts, it would hardly be difficult for a federal court to reject
the defense of good faith ignorance of the law. 192
2. Sentencing Exposure
In his dissenting opinion in Attorney General of Canada v. t.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.,193 Judge Calabresi correcdy recognized that
any sentencing determination flowing from a mail or wire fraud con-
viction in this context would require an assessment of the monetary
loss suffered by the foreign government, as established by foreign
law. 194 Although his summary conclusion that this situation did not
create tension with the principles supporting the revenue rule is sus-
pect, at least outside the Second Circuit, 195 Calabresi's opinion did
raise a valid point that is worthy of discussion. 196 However, as this
final section will demonstrate, federal courts are sufficiently compe-
tent to deal with foreign tax law for the purposes of determining the
appropriate sentence. 197
According to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 198 the sentence
imposed upon those convicted of either mail or wire fraud is gov-
erned, for present purposes, by the offense conduct provision
§ 2B1.1.199 Under that provision, the offense level obtained is con-
191 See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 ("Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's good[-
]faith belief claim, the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any
source showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat wages as
income .... ").
192 Although the possibility exists that a zealous prosecutor might charge mail or wire
fraud in connection with a much more complicated and less clear international smuggling
case, the risk of such prosecutorial overreaching would be lessened, in large part, by the
probable difficulty of proving fraudulent intent. See, e.g., United States v. Regent Office
Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1180-82 (2d Cir. 1970) (reasoning that an intent to deceive is
not necessarily sufficient to prove an intent to defraud).
193 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002).
194 See id. at 138 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
195 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
196 The only case to confront the present issue after Calabresi's opinion was filed did
not address the role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in its revenue rule analysis. See
Paquantino I, 305 F.3d 291, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh 'g en banc granted by 2003
U.S. App. LEXIS 585 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003).
197 Of course, one might question whether courts defining the scope of substantive
liability under federal law should consider the possibility of subsequent sentencing difficul-
ties when making these determinations. Such a discussion is unnecessary for present pur-
poses, however, since this Note ultimately concludes that any apparent difficulties are in
fact illusory.
198 U.S. SENTENCINc GUIDELINES MANUAL (2001). For a detailed discussion of how the
Guidelines operate, see generally O'SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 384-99, which explains the
various elements considered in sentencing.
199 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A, at 459. While the statutory index
indicates that sections 2B1.1 or 2C1.7 may apply to convictions under the mail or wire
fraud provisions, section 2C1.7 applies only where the object of the fraud was the intangi-
ble right to honest services, see 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000), as opposed to the tangible prop-
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trolled predominately by the amount of the loss caused by the fraudu-
lent conduct.200 Subject to specific exclusions,201 the loss figure which
the court should apply is "the greater of actual loss or intended
loss."202 In determining the relevant loss amount, the trial court is
permitted to rely on "a reasonable estimate," and the court's determi-
nation "is entitled to appropriate deference."20 3
As a threshold matter, there is no per se rule precluding the in-
clusion of financial loss to a foreign government in the total loss
amount for § 2B1.1 purposes. When related to crimes against the
United States, courts have affirmatively held that such losses should be
included in assessing the appropriate offense level.20 4 In the present
context, the misuse of U.S. mails or wires in furtherance of an illegal
operation transforms schemes to defraud foreign governments of im-
port duties into crimes against the United States.20 5 Therefore, a
court must account for the losses arising from these schemes when
determining the appropriate sentence.
The question remains, however, whether the courts of the United
States are competent to determine the extent of these losses. Assum-
ing for a moment that American courts are unable to decipher a par-
ticular foreign government's tax laws in a given case, an alternative
path to assessing the appropriate sentence is available. As the applica-
tion notes to § 2B1.1 explain, when determining the appropriate of-
fense level, the financial gain realized by the convicted individual may
suffice as a proxy for the loss suffered by the foreign government.20 6
For example, suppose A successfully smuggles 10,000 cartons of Amer-
erty rights targeted in the international smuggling operations here considered. See id.
§ 2C1.7 cmt. n. 1.
200 The Guidelines provide a table that indicates the degree to which the offense level
should be increased, based upon the amount of financial loss attributable to the fraud. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.1(b) (1).
201 Notably, the Guidelines do not explicitly list losses to foreign governments in the
category of items to be excluded in the determination of loss. See id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2(D).
202 See id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2(A), at 71.
203 Id. at § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2(C); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (noting that when reviewing
a sentence imposed by the trial judge, the circuit court "shall accept the findings of fact of
the district or unless they are clea rly erroneous and shall give due deference to the
district court's application of the guidelines to the facts").
204 See, e.g., United States v. Chmielewski, 218 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2000); cf United
States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to consider harm to a
foreign government in determining the proper sentence where the loss was not related to
crimes against the United States).
205 Cf United States v. Chunza-Plazas, 45 F.3d 51, 57-58 (2d. Cir. 1995) (concluding
that the district court erred by considering illegal activities conducted in Colombia when
determining the appropriate sentence, since the conduct did not involve crimes against
the United States).
206 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.L, cmt. n.2(B) ("The court shall use
the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a
loss but it reasonably cannot be determined.").
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ican cigarettes into Canada, and avoids paying a substantial import
duty under Canadian law. Further assume that A subsequently sells
these cartons for $10 less than the prevailing market rate for imported
American cigarettes in Canada, a discount attributable to A's fraudu-
lently obtained savings at the border.20 7 If the district court sentenc-
ing A for wire fraud in connection with this scheme concluded that it
could not reasonably determine the loss suffered by the Canadian gov-
ernment, it could instead base A's offense level and sentence on the
$100,000 gain he realized as the direct result of the smuggling
operation. 208
There is little reason to assume, however, that federal courts will
be unable to understand foreign tax laws to the extent necessary to
reasonably estimate the loss attributable to the fraudulent operation.
Indeed, it is universally recognized that the government need only
prove the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 9 In
the case of A's hypothetical smuggling operation, there are a number
of avenues available to satisfy this standard for the purposes of demon-
strating the amount of taxes fraudulently withheld under Canadian
law. For example, the United States could introduce evidence demon-
strating the average import duty assessed at the Canadian border for
comparably sized shipments of American cigarettes. It could also in-
troduce testimony from experts on Canadian tax law. 210 Nothing in
207 Although a district court engaging in this sort of analysis will be required to make a
series of estimations in ascertaining A's gain, the Guidelines require only a "reasonable
estimation" of the less. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
208 For another example of use of gain to determine loss, consider the following exam-
ple, which is based in large part on the facts of Attorney General of Canada v. R. Reynolds
Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2001). Cigarette manufacturer C Cor-
poration produces 10,000 cartons of cigarettes at its plant in the United States, but labels
the cigarettes as if it produced them in Canada. C Corporation then sells the cartons to B,
a known smuggler, for $15 less than the average price in Canada. Finally, B smuggles the
cigarettes into Canada and sells them on the black market at a price $10 less than prevail-
ing rate. Following her conviction for wire fraud, B's sentencing exposure could be mea-
sured based on the amount of her own financial gain: $50,000.
209 See, e.g., United States v. Schild, 269 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing United
States v. Nichols, 229 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 2000)); United States v. Higgins, 270 F.3d
1070, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 2001).
210 Indeed, the United States government would ordinarily be expected to call a Cana-
dian tax expert at trial in order to prove that the defendant's activities were fraudulent in
the first place. This was precisely the path taken by the prosecution in Pasquantino. The
Fourth Circuit panel summarized:
Canada Customs intelligence officer GinaJonah testified that there is a Ca-
nadian federal excise tax . . . on liquor imported from the United States
into Canada. Officer Jonah . . . explained that the equivalent of approxi-
mately $100 in United States currency would be due and owing on a case of
liquor that was purchased in the United States and imported into Canada.
305 F.3d 291, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), vacated and reh'g en banc granted by
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 585 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2003); see also United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d
580, 584 (1st Cir. 1996) (indicating that the United States called an expert on Canadian
taxes at trial); cf United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing de-
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the notes following section 2Bl.1 precludes reliance on either of these
forms of evidence; it simply charges that "[t]he estimate of the loss
shall be based on available information." 21' Given the substantial lee-
way that the Guidelines afford trial judges to ascertain the amount of
loss in fraud cases, one cannot argue plausibly that interpretation of
foreign tax laws presents an insurmountable conceptual obstacle.
CONCLUSION
Whatever the merits of retaining the revenue rule in the modern
world,212 it is clear that it cannot justifiably be applied to preclude
mail and wire fraud prosecutions targeting schemes to deprive foreign
governments of earned excise tax revenues. The policies purportedly
advanced by the revenue rule in its paradigmatic context are simply
not implicated when the federal government initiates criminal prose-
cutions to enforce the will of Congress and thereby promote the inter-
ests of the United States. Moreover, the federal judiciary is wholly
capable of interpreting and applying foreign law, to the limited extent
necessary, in order to properly administer these prosecutions.
Having repudiated the arguments for applying the revenue rule
in this context, one is left with the impression that those courts which
have resisted prosecutions of this type are silently protesting the
breadth of the federal fraud statutes.213 To the extent that this intui-
tion is valid, it exposes an unfortunate reality. While it certainly can
be argued that the mail and wire fraud statutes as presently delineated
cast too wide a net, there is no justification for arbitrarily narrowing
the scope of these provisions in isolated contexts, purportedly relying
on principles of law which in fact bear no defensible relation to the
situation at hand.
fendants' convictions because "no evidence [existed] in the record demonstrating the exis-
tence of a Canadian duty [on imported liquor]" and noting that "no experts on Canadian
law testified [at trial]").
211 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, cmt. n.2(C).
212 Compare Kovatch, supra note 9, at 287 (calling the revenue rule "an anachronism in
American law"), with Boots, 80 F.3d at 587 (referring to the revenue rule as "a firmly embed-
ded principle of common law" (citing Holman v.Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.
1775)).
213 See supra notes 100, 127, 141 and accompanying text.
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